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GREENING DEMAND: ENERGY
CONSUMPTION AND U.S. CLIMATE POLICY
NOAH M. SACHS†
ABSTRACT
The search for greener, less polluting energy supplies has
dominated discussions of U.S. climate change strategy, but we often
overlook cheaper and faster greenhouse gas emissions reductions
achievable through energy efficiency and conservation. In this article, I
outline a decade-long “greening demand” agenda to reduce the amount
of energy consumed in the United States. The federal government
should aim to reduce U.S. energy consumption by fifteen percent by
2016 and twenty percent by 2020 to achieve needed reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.
While the United States has achieved notable efficiency gains since
the 1970s, several market failures and other barriers continue to serve
as obstacles to energy savings. These include principal-agent
divergence, high implicit discount rates used in decision making on
efficiency upgrades, and outmoded forms of utility regulation. I
demonstrate how a greening demand agenda, centered on price signals,
performance standards, informational tools, and changes in utility
regulation can be used to overcome these barriers. Many of the
challenges are technical and scientific, but law will play a central role in
structuring incentives and shaping national markets for efficiency
innovations. I conclude with some thoughts on the technical and
political feasibility of greening demand.
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In the heat of the presidential campaign in the summer of 2008,
when gasoline sold for over $4.00 a gallon, Americans changed their
1
driving and car buying habits. SUV sales plummeted. Amtrak
2
ridership was up. For a brief time, we had a glimpse of the
transformation in consumer behavior that could occur in response to
higher energy prices. By the time President Obama was inaugurated
in January 2009, however, gasoline was selling below $1.70 a gallon—
a remarkable, unexpected decline in retail gas prices of more than
fifty percent in just six months.
Price volatility is just one of many barriers to achieving long-term
3
reductions in energy use in the United States —reductions that are
now essential for addressing climate change and improving energy
security.
Except for moments of public attention to energy
consumption, as in the late 1970s and the summer of 2008, the United
States has focused primarily on finding (or militarily defending)
sources of energy supply. From the synfuel research program of the
Carter Administration to today’s interest in new offshore drilling and
ethanol subsidies,4 we are constantly looking for new cats to chase the
speedy mouse of American energy demand.
We can no longer afford, however, to view rising energy demand
as an exogenous variable—an unquestioned “given” of American life

1. See Dee-Ann Durbin, SUV and Truck Sales Plunge, WASH. POST, May 2, 2008, at D2
(reporting dramatic SUV sales decreases at GM, Chrysler, and Ford between April 2007 and
April 2008, including a thirty-six percent decline at Ford).
2. See Bob Dart, Amtrak Ridership Rises Along with Gas Prices, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
May 28, 2008, at E1 (noting that “[r]ising gas prices are contributing to a surge in train travel”);
Press Release, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., Amtrak Downeaster and Empire Service Show
Dramatic Increases in Ridership and Revenue (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://
www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/News_Release_Page&c
=am2Copy&cid=1178294243600&ssid=180 (noting that fiscal year 2008 marked the sixth
straight year of ridership gains and saw the highest ridership since 1971).
3. In a November 16, 2008 interview with 60 Minutes, President-elect Obama was asked
whether declining gas prices might reduce the relative priority of energy policy in his
administration. Obama answered in the negative and responded:
We go from shock to trance. You know, oil prices go up, gas prices at the pump go up,
everybody goes into a flurry of activity. And then the prices go back down and
suddenly we act like it’s not important, and we start, you know filling up our SUVs
again. And, as a consequence, we never make any progress. It’s part of the addiction,
all right. That has to be broken. Now is the time to break it.
Interview by Steve Croft, Correspondent, 60 Minutes, with Barack Obama, then President-elect
of the United States, in Chicago, Ill., in Obama on Economic Crisis, Transition, CBS NEWS,
Nov.
16,
2008,
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/16/60minutes/
main4607893.shtml.
4. See, e.g., VITO A. STAGLIANO, A POLICY OF DISCONTENT: THE MAKING OF A
NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY, at xiii–xvi (2001).
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that drives policy decisions on supply. With urgent concerns about
climate change and energy security, greening demand now needs to
become the cornerstone of U.S. energy and environmental policy. By
“greening demand,” I mean reducing total annual U.S. energy
consumption, particularly from fossil fuels.5 To green demand,
government and the private sector need to promote both energyefficient technologies, which can produce the same work with fewer
energy inputs, and conservation, which means consumers and firms
6
must use energy less intensively.
The objective of a greening demand agenda under the Obama
Administration should be a fifteen percent reduction in total U.S.
energy consumption by 2016 and a twenty percent reduction by 2020.
These objectives are consistent with needed forty percent reductions
7
in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, and with President
Obama’s campaign pledge to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
to 1990 levels by 2020.8 Achieving any substantial reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions in the near-term depends critically on
greening demand. Emissions reductions of fifteen percent or more
within ten years are unlikely to occur solely through greening supply,
such as changing the mix of energy sources in the United States.

5. Currently, about eighty-five percent of the energy consumed in the United States
comes from fossil fuels, such as oil, coal, and natural gas. U.S. Department of Energy, Fossil
Fuels, http://www.energy.gov/energysources/fossilfuels.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
6. The difference between efficiency and conservation can be seen through an example of
a typical office building. Efficiency measures would include replacing incandescent light bulbs
with fluorescent bulbs that provide the same lighting services with far lower energy inputs.
Conservation measures would include installing motion detectors to ensure that lights are on
only when people are in a room or increasing natural light to reduce the number of light bulbs
needed in the first place.
7. Climate scientists have stated that global greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced at
least eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050 to avoid dangerous climate disruption. See, e.g.,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, U.S. SCIENTISTS AND ECONOMISTS’ CALL FOR SWIFT AND
DEEP CUTS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 5 (2008), available at http://
www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Scientist_Economists_Call_to_Action_fnl.pd
f. Since the United States is currently emitting about seventeen percent more greenhouse gases
annually than it did in 1990, see ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2007, at 1 (2008), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2007).pdf, a forty percent reduction from
present levels is a reasonable minimum target for the year 2030.
8. See BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA 1 (2008), available
at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf; Jeff Zeleny, Obama
Proposes Capping Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Making Polluters Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2007, at A24.
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This article, which contributes to an emerging literature on
consumption and climate change,9 outlines the energy consumption
challenge that the United States faces and proposes policy tools that
the federal government should deploy to overcome longstanding
barriers to reducing energy demand. I argue that putting a price on
carbon emissions through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is an
essential part of a greening demand strategy. Indeed, pricing carbon
emissions is the policy change that would achieve the greatest
economy-wide impact in tempering energy consumption. However,
there are also numerous market failures and informational barriers
that make energy prices a “fuzzy” signal for spurring reductions in
energy consumption.
These barriers include principal-agent
divergence of interests, high implicit discount rates used in purchases
of energy-using products, inadequate information on energy pricing
and usage by individuals, and a lack of incentives for utilities to
undertake investments in efficiency measures.
The persistence of these barriers suggests that we cannot rely
solely on price signals to drive changes in behavior and consumption
10
Instead, government needs to play an active role in
habits.
surmounting these barriers through a toolbox approach that would
include product performance standards, information disclosure
requirements, and changes in utility regulation. These approaches
have proven effective in the past in pollution control policy, and a
more ambitious greening demand agenda, using this policy toolbox to
reduce energy consumption, is technically and politically feasible.
Greening demand offers the prospect of both cost savings and
environmental improvement, and it is therefore an indispensable
component of the U.S. climate change strategy.

9. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change
and Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10825 (2008); Symposium, The Next Frontier: Individual
and Household Environmental Behavior, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 723 (2005); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as a Regulated Entity in the New Era of
Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2004); Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and
Environmental Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543 (1999);
CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION (Thomas Princen, Michael F. Maniates & Ken Conca eds.,
2002).
10. See AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, ENERGY FUTURE, THINK EFFICIENCY: HOW AMERICA
CAN LOOK WITHIN TO ACHIEVE ENERGY SECURITY AND REDUCE GLOBAL WARMING 24
(2008), available at http://www.aps.org/energyefficiencyreport/report/aps-energyreport.pdf
(“[M]arket forces alone cannot drive the adoption of energy-efficiency technologies in a
beneficially sustained manner within the timeframe imposed by the challenges of global
warming.”).
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I. THE CHALLENGE OF U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION
A. Long-Term Trends
There are two possible perspectives on long-term trends in U.S.
energy consumption. The positive news is that the energy intensity of
the U.S. economy—the energy needed to produce a dollar of gross
11
This
domestic product (GDP)—has been declining for decades.
means that the United States has succeeded over time in producing its
goods and services with fewer energy inputs.
Similarly, the
greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy—the amount of
greenhouse gases emitted per dollar of GDP—has also been declining
for decades.12 These trends reflect policy measures adopted in the
1970s and 1980s to promote efficiency, as well as a macro-economic
shift away from heavy manufacturing to information technology and
service sector jobs that are less energy-intensive.13 President Bush,
taking advantage of these long-term trends, pledged in 2002 to reduce
the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by eighteen percent
in ten years, and the United States has remained on track to achieve
that goal.14
On the other hand, the absolute amount of energy consumed in
the United States has been rising for decades. It is the absolute level
of fossil fuel consumed and greenhouse gases emitted, not the ratio of
those figures to GDP, which determines the ecological impacts from
energy consumption. Total U.S. energy consumption has nearly
doubled since 1965.15 U.S. consumption of coal for electricity has

11. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Intensity Indicators in the U.S.,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/ba/pba/intensityindicators/total_energy.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2009).
12. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Trends in U.S. Carbon Intensity and Total
Greenhouse Gas Intensity (Dec. 2004), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/archive/gg04rpt/
trends.html.
13. John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy
Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15, 32 (2007).
14. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, An Empirical Analysis of Energy Intensity and Its Determinants
at the State Level, 29 ENERGY J. 1, 19 (2008) (concluding that “little policy intervention may be
required to achieve the Bush Administration’s goal of an 18 percent reduction in carbon
intensity by the end of this decade”); see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the
Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Earth Day 2007 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070420-9.html (noting that “we are well on
track to meet this [eighteen percent] goal”).
15. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2007, at
38 tbl.2.1(a) (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf (providing energy
consumption by sector from 1949–2007).
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doubled since 1979.16 Annual U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have
already increased more than ten percent since 1992,17 when the
United States committed, in the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, to “limit[] its anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases.”18
On a per capita basis, Americans rank among the highest energy
consumers on the planet. With 4.5% of global population, Americans
annually consume about 22% of the world’s energy supplies.19
Americans’ per capita energy consumption is about twice as high as
other industrialized nations, as shown in Table I below. Our
enormous consumption habit not only causes climate disruption, but
also leaves the U.S. economy vulnerable to supply disruptions from
war, political instability, and peak oil.
TABLE I – PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION, IN MILLION BTUS
20
(2006)
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Italy
Japan
South Korea

335
162
178
181
139
179
193

As Table I suggests, we have a severe case of energy bloat in
the United States. If there is any upside to this energy profligacy, it is
that there is enormous untapped potential to reduce both energy
consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States. The embedded “excess” energy in our current industrial,

16. Id. at 240 tbl.8.5(a) (providing consumption of combustible fuels for electricity by all
sectors from 1949–2007).
17. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 7, at 1 (noting a 10.75% rise in U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions since 1995 and a 16.7% rise since 1990).
18. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 164, art. 4(2)(a).
19. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MCKINSEY & CO., WASTED ENERGY: HOW THE U.S. CAN
REACH ITS ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY POTENTIAL 6 (2007) (providing 2003 figures).
20. See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, International Total Primary Energy
Consumption and Energy Intensity, Per Capita (Per Person) Total Primary Energy
Consumption (Million Btu Per Person), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
international/energyconsumption.html (follow “Most Countries, 1980–2006 for the International
Energy Annual 2006”).
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transportation, and residential systems should be viewed as a
mineable resource. Indeed, improved efficiency is the “first fuel” the
United States should turn to for powering its economy in a time of
deep fiscal constraints and dependence on hostile states for energy
supplies.21
Reducing energy demand, however, is among the most neglected
elements of U.S. environmental policy. Every president since Nixon
has rhetorically touted the virtues of energy efficiency, but in practice,
the federal government has focused primarily on ensuring
uninterrupted supply.22 The Bush Administration offered a meager
23
energy efficiency package in its 2001 energy plan, a package that
focused mainly on public education, fuel savings at federal facilities,
expanding the Energy Star labeling program, and undertaking further
studies on efficiency measures. Just before the plan was released,
Vice President Cheney famously dismissed energy conservation as a
mere “personal virtue.”24 Under the Bush Administration, the most
notable efficiency measures were the 2005 tax credit for hybrid
vehicles (which was tilted toward benefiting U.S. automakers rather
than promoting hybrids overall),25 and the 2007 increase in Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles (which

21. See MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON.,
REPORT NO. E082, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: THE FIRST FUEL FOR A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE
(2008), available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e082.pdf.
22. Federal efforts directly aimed at reducing energy consumption, such as Corporate
Average Fuel Economy standards first mandated in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–19 (2006), and appliance efficiency standards first mandated in the
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–97 (2006), are notable
exceptions to the dominant focus on energy supply.
23. See NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: RELIABLE,
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 4-11 to -12
(2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/energy/2001/National-EnergyPolicy.pdf.
24. Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United States, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
the Associated Press in Toronto, Can. (Apr. 30, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/environment/energy/cheney_4-30.html (declaring that conservation, while “a sign
of personal virtue,” is “not a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy”).
25. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
30B) (2006). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a consumer tax credit on the first 60,000
hybrid cars sold by each automaker (with a phase-out of the credit after the 60,000 mark).
Toyota hit that mark in June 2006, and Honda reached it in late 2007. The tax credit has
primarily benefited U.S. automakers producing hybrid models. See David Leonhardt, U.S.
Hybrids Get More Miles Per Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at C1 (noting that the credit
will incentivize consumers to purchase cars such as the Chevrolet Silverado hybrid, which gets
only sixteen miles per gallon).
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was less ambitious than fuel economy standards enacted in Europe,
China, and Japan).26
The Obama Administration is clearly shifting toward a stronger
national commitment to energy efficiency and greenhouse gas
controls. In May 2009, the Administration reached an agreement
with automakers and several states that will raise fuel economy
standards faster than the 2007 legislation requires.27 The economic
stimulus package signed by President Obama in February 2009
contained over $20 billion in new funding for energy efficiency
programs28—far more than any previous American legislation. This
commitment toward greening demand needs to be sustained into the
future.
The United States now confronts a formidable energy and
environmental challenge: U.S. energy consumption is projected to
29
increase continually through 2030. But in the same time period, the
United States must cut its greenhouse gas emissions at least forty
percent below current levels—in conjunction with similar reductions
by other nations—to avoid dangerous climate disruption.30 It is
unlikely that the United States can thread that needle solely through
a massive shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy or through
deployment of carbon capture and sequestration technologies.
Instead, significant emissions reductions will be achievable only

26. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121 Stat.
1498–1499 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 30101) (raising Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards from 27.5 mpg to 35 mpg by 2020); see also Andreas Biermann, Int’l Energy Agency,
Integrating Climate Change and Security Concerns (Feb. 15, 2008), http://
www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/02_15_08_Biermann_Energy.pdf (comparing U.S., European,
Japanese, and Chinese fuel economy standards).
27. E.g., John M. Broder, Obama to Toughen Rules on Emissions and Mileage, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2009, at A1.
28. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009). The stimulus bill included $5 billion in home weatherization assistance, $6.3 billion for
energy efficiency grants to states and local governments, and $300 million in tax credits for
purchase of energy-efficient appliances. See What’s in the Stimulus Bill—A Breakdown: Getting
to $787 Billion, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/STIMULUS_FINAL_0217.html; see also Kate Galbraith, Preparing for a Flood of
Energy Efficiency Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B1 (outlining how efficiency funds
might be used by states and municipalities).
29. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2009, at 109 tbl.A1 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2009).pdf
(projecting total energy consumption to increase by half a percent per year from 2006 until
2030).
30. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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through a shift toward low-carbon sources of energy supply and
reductions in energy demand.
B. Benefits of Greening Demand
Greening demand should be the cornerstone of U.S. climate
change policy for several reasons.
1. Cost
Measured in terms of initial capital costs or ongoing expenses,
investments that reduce energy consumption are usually far less
expensive than building new sources of energy supply. According to
the International Energy Agency, an additional $1 spent on more
efficient electrical equipment, appliances, and buildings avoids, on
average, $2 in investment in energy supply.31 For planning purposes,
U.S. government regulators estimate the cost of efficiency
improvements at three cents per kilowatt hour saved,32 and a widely
cited 2007 report by McKinsey & Co. identified about a dozen energy
efficiency improvements in the residential, commercial, and industrial
sectors that could reduce greenhouse gas emissions at negative
33
marginal cost—at a net savings to the economy. In contrast, new
coal-fired plants ordered in 2009 are likely to sell electricity for ten to
thirteen cents per kilowatt hour, and new nuclear power plants are
likely to sell electricity for fifteen to twenty-one cents per kilowatt
hour, based on projected capital costs.34 Efficiency improvements and
energy conservation are the low-hanging fruit of U.S. greenhouse gas
reductions.

31. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MCKINSEY & CO., THE CASE FOR INVESTING IN ENERGY
PRODUCTIVITY 8 (2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/Investing_
Energy_Productivity.
32. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DEP’T OF ENERGY, INCREASING COSTS IN
ELECTRIC MARKETS 14 (2008), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/06-19-08cost-electric.pdf.
33. JON CREYTS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS:
HOW MUCH AT WHAT COST? U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT MAPPING INITIATIVE,
EXECUTIVE REPORT, at xiii exhibit B (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/
clientservice/ccsi/pdf/US_ghg_final_report.pdf.
34. AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NUCLEAR POWER: CLIMATE FIX
FOLLY? 3 (2008), available at http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E09OR
01_NuclPwrClimFixFolly1i09.pdf. The cost differential between efficiency improvements and
fossil energy sources will be even more pronounced if a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system is
implemented.
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2. Speed of Implementation
Energy efficiency improvements and energy conservation can
often be implemented faster than bringing new sources of energy
supply to market. Efficiency measures do not require lengthy siting,
permitting, or construction processes. They also do not require
construction of new transmission lines, which is one of the major
current barriers to deployment of large-scale renewable energy
35
projects.
In contrast, adding carbon-neutral generating capacity, to the
extent that it would make a substantial difference in overall U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions, is likely to be a slow process extending
over several decades. The Energy Information Administration
projects that U.S. renewable energy generating capacity will increase
36
However, absent major policy
by 1.9% annually through 2030.
intervention, renewable energy is projected to comprise only about
twelve percent of total installed capacity in 2030, when coal is still
projected to be the dominant source of electricity in the United
States.37
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received
38
applications for twenty-six new reactors, but only a handful of these
new plants will likely be in operation by 2020. The Electric Power
Research Institute, the research arm of America’s electric utilities,
has acknowledged that carbon sequestration from current electric
power plants will not be practicable before 2020.39 With financing,
construction, and permitting hurdles on the supply side, near-term
reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions depend critically on
substantial reductions in energy demand.

35. See, e.g., Darrell Blakeway & Carol Brotman White, Tapping the Power of Wind:
FERC Initiatives to Facilitate Transmission of Wind Power, 26 ENERGY L.J. 393, 393–94 (2005)
(noting that wind generation faces “stiff obstacles in reaching customers” because wind
resources are often located far from where the load is needed, requiring substantial investment
in transmission capacity).
36. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 29, at 141 tbl.A16.
37. See id. at 128 tbl.A9 (noting that total projected generating capacity in the United
States in 2030 is 1,123.8 gigawatts, of which 138.2 gigawatts will be in the form of renewable
generation and 347.9 gigawatts will be in the form of coal-fired power plants).
38. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Combined License Applications for New
Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). The
Energy Information Administration projects that the total installed nuclear capacity in the
United States will increase by eight percent by 2020, and by twelve percent by 2030. See
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 29, at 128 tbl.A9.
39. See Dallas Kachan, 1990 by 2020? Forget It, Says EPRI, CLEANTECH GROUP, Apr. 20,
2007, http://cleantech.com/news/1064/1990-by-2020-forget-it-says-epri.
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3. Conventional Pollutant Reductions
While current political attention focuses on the nexus between
energy and climate change, the effects of rising energy consumption
on conventional pollution should not be ignored. Nearly forty years
40
after enactment of the Clean Air Act, over 130 million Americans
still live in regions that exceed health-based standards for groundlevel ozone—a problem that is largely attributable to vehicle
emissions and electricity generation (primarily from coal-fired power
plants).41
A greening demand agenda for climate change will have
numerous ancillary benefits for reducing conventional pollution. The
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy has estimated,
for example, that enacting or updating energy efficiency standards for
fifteen common household and commercial appliances would reduce
42
projected 2020 energy demand by fifty-two billion kilowatt hours.
This amount is equivalent to avoiding construction of forty 300
43
And, as we were
megawatt power plants in the United States.
reminded by the devastating coal ash spill near Kingston, Tennessee
44
in December 2008, the ecological impacts of fossil-based electricity
production go beyond air pollution. They include damage to rivers
and streams, despoliation of public lands, production of toxic wastes
and mining debris, and mountaintop removal in large swaths of
Appalachia.
II. BARRIERS TO REDUCING ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Rising energy consumption in the United States since the 1970s
has been driven by the combination of cheap energy and consumer

40. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000).
41. See U.S. EPA, Air Emission Sources: Nitrogen Oxides, http://www.epa.gov/
air/emissions/nox.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (listing vehicles and electricity generation as
the two largest sources of nitrogen oxide emissions, an ozone precursor); U.S. EPA, Air
Emission Sources: Volatile Organic Compounds, http://www.epa.gov/air/emissions/voc.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009) (identifying vehicles as the greatest contributor of VOC emissions, an
ozone precursor).
42. STEVEN NADEL ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. &
APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, LEADING THE WAY: CONTINUED
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW STATE APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS, at
iv–v (2006) (recommending updated efficiency standards for various appliances such as
commercial boilers, DVD players and recorders, pool heaters, hot tubs, residential furnaces and
boilers, and walk-in refrigerators and freezers).
43. Id. at v.
44. Shaila Dewan, Coal Ash Spill Revives Issue of Its Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008,
at A1.
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desires for larger homes, bigger cars, and more energy-intensive
products, such as cell phones, computers, and sixty-inch plasma TVs.45
As some appliances, such as refrigerators, have become substantially
46
more energy-efficient, Americans continue to desire new appliances,
such as large TVs and set-top boxes for digital cable, that consume
47
almost as much energy as a refrigerator.
A greening demand strategy, therefore, needs to be economywide, rather than focused on particular products. Putting a price on
carbon emissions, through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, is
the single most important policy change that would move the United
States away from wasteful energy consumption habits. It is also the
key to spurring new investment in renewable energy supplies.
48
Because energy demand is price-elastic, a carbon tax or a cap-andtrade system designed to raise the price of energy and to reflect the
true costs of environmental damage from our energy system should
be a central component of the greening demand agenda.
The optimal design of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems
has been exhaustively covered in other literature,49 and I do not

45. See ANDREW FANARA ET AL., HOW SMALL DEVICES ARE HAVING A BIG IMPACT ON
U.S. UTILITY BILLS, 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/
prod_development/downloads/EEDAL-145.pdf (explaining that twenty-eight percent of all
residential electricity consumption is for miscellaneous electronic devices other than the
categories traditionally tracked by the Department of Energy, such as lighting and appliances,
and that this proportion is rising over time).
46. See Dernbach, supra note 13, at 19–26.
47. See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, TUNING IN TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY: PROSPECTS
FOR ENERGY SAVINGS IN TELEVISIONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.nrdc.org/air/
energy/energyeff/ftv.pdf.
48. Economists continue to debate price elasticities for various forms of energy and the
optimal size of a carbon tax or carbon cap. For a discussion of how gasoline demand responds
to price increases, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING GASOLINE CONSUMPTION: THREE
POLICY OPTIONS 15–18 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3991/11-21GasolineStudy.pdf. For a discussion of the optimal level of a gasoline tax, see Ian W.H. Parry &
Kenneth A. Small, Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax?, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 1276 (2005) (concluding that the optimal U.S. gasoline tax, reflecting externalities
from environmental damage, road congestion, and accidents, is $1.01 per gallon).
49. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 67 (2008); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); William D. Nordhaus, To Tax
or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. &
POL’Y 26 (2007); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS
FOR REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS (2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/28xx/doc2876/CapTrade.pdf. For an overview of the debate on the merits of carbon
taxes versus cap-and-trade systems to address climate change, see U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-605, CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPERT OPINION ON THE
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attempt to replicate that debate here. Rather, my central goal in this
article is to show that a carbon pricing strategy, while critically
important, needs to be supplemented with other federal initiatives to
reduce energy demand. Price signals, on their own, are unlikely to
drive sufficient reductions in energy demand because market failures,
informational constraints, and other barriers often make energy
prices a fuzzy signal for incentivizing reduced energy consumption by
individuals and firms.50 These barriers will persist even after
enactment of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system puts a price on
emissions. Below, I discuss several of these barriers and propose
policy initiatives to address them.
A. Principal-Agent Divergence
One persistent barrier to improvements in energy efficiency has
been the divergence of interests between entities making purchase
decisions for energy-using equipment and the entities paying the
energy bill. Purchasers of equipment have little incentive to identify,
or pay extra for, the most energy-efficient tools and appliances if they
are not internalizing the long-term operating expenses of their
choices. At the same time, the utility bill-paying “principal” often has
little incentive or opportunity to monitor the choices of the “agent”
51
making the initial capital purchase decisions.
This divergence can be seen clearly in the example of rental
housing, where landlords usually choose the major appliances for
apartments and tenants usually pay the utility bills. Thirty-two
percent of American households are rentals, and tenants pay utility
52
bills in over eighty percent of these units, so the impact of this

ECONOMICS OF POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08605.pdf.
50. See Michael Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1755 (2008) (“[N]umerous empirical studies demonstrate that in
practice, limited information, high transaction costs, and a wide range of behavioral phenomena
limit the extent to which price alone affects behavior.”); see also Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N.
Stavins, The Energy Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology, 16 RESOURCE &
ENERGY ECON. 91, 98–99, 111–19 (1994) (noting market failures for energy-efficient products
and practices, such as principal-agent divergence and inadequate information, and positing a
welfare-enhancing role for government interventions to correct those failures).
51. See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 5 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (“[A]gency loss is the most severe when the interests or values of the
principal and agent diverge substantially, and information monitoring is costly.”).
52. See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS
OF MARKET FAILURES IN THE END-USE OF ENERGY 13 fig.1 (2007), available at http://
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divergence is far from negligible. A similar divergence of interests
can be seen in the market for new homes, where builders make
essentially all the major decisions about insulation, windows,
appliances, and other features of the home that affect energy use,
while home buyers pay the subsequent utility bills. Even within a
single firm, it is often the case that major capital equipment is
purchased by one department whose employees have an incentive to
minimize up-front costs, whereas the long-term energy cost of that
equipment is paid by a separate department in the same corporation.53
As these examples illustrate, energy is often consumed by end-users
who have little control over the efficiency of the products they use or
who are shielded, to some extent, from the costs of their energy
consumption.54
B. Information and Search Costs
A second barrier to adoption of energy-efficient products and
practices is that identifying areas for energy savings can involve
substantial information and search costs.55
To reduce energy
consumption, firms and consumers need to understand their own
energy usage habits, alternative available technologies, and the
amount of energy and money that might be saved through a switch to
an alternative product or behavior. These comparisons often require
a level of technical expertise and knowledge of energy pricing beyond
the grasp of most consumers. Moreover, the search costs of obtaining
the relevant information may be greater than the dollar value of
potential savings.

www.aceee.org/Energy/IEAmarketbarriers.pdf (noting that there were 33.6 million rental
households in the United States in 2003, and that in approximately 29.2 million of those
households the tenants paid the utility bills).
53. See Stephen J. DeCanio, Barriers within Firms to Energy-Efficient Investments, 21
ENERGY POL’Y 906, 908 (1993) (“Within the framework of decentralized corporations,
multidivisional structures or government bureaucracies, individual maximization can produce
results contrary to the formal goals of the organization. A wide variety of circumstances can
lead to a failure of the organization to maximize profits or minimize costs, even though the
individual agents are fully rational wealth maximizers.”).
54. See, e.g., SCOTT MURTISHAW & JAYANT SATHAYE, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM ON
U.S. RESIDENTIAL ENERGY USE 2–4 (2006), available at http://ies.lbl.gov/iespubs/59773Rev.pdf.
55. See Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 147, 163
(2005) (“The gallon of gasoline for which I pay $1.75 may be selling for $1.50 a block away, yet
if I and other consumers do not know this, the disparity in price may persist. The existence of
search costs and other information costs is now an established feature of rational-choice
economics . . . .”).
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In the residential sector, a related problem is that most
consumers cannot calculate how much electricity or natural gas any
56
one item in their home or apartment uses, nor do they usually know
their real-time energy use in the residence, given current metering
practices. Consumers therefore have little incentive to absorb the
information and search costs to find alternative products or to cut
back on energy usage. With our current system of electricity and
natural gas metering, we are like diners at a restaurant with no prices
on the menu. We may be shocked by the bill at the end of the dinner,
but without item-specific price information, we will leave the
restaurant unsure about how to order differently next time.
C. High Discount Rates
Economists have documented that purchasers of cars, appliances,
lighting, and electronics employ a high implicit discount rate, ranging
from 25% to 300%, with respect to future savings from energy
efficiency.57 Such discount rates mean that consumers have a very low
sensitivity to the prospect of a reduction in energy bills even a year or
two into the future. Consumers instead have a laser-like focus on the
initial purchase price of equipment and tend to heavily, and
irrationally, discount future savings in operational costs, demanding
rates of return from energy efficiency that widely exceed market
interest rates. Literature in behavioral economics suggests that this
deviation from predicted rationality results from aversion to present
losses and consumer difficulty in trading off present and future losses
and gains.58 Whatever the roots of the behavior, the implicit use of
high discount rates is an important barrier to more widespread
59
adoption of energy-efficient technologies in the retail market.

56. The National Research Council, noting that most consumers lack awareness about their
levels of residential energy use and the sources of their energy supply, has referred to this
phenomenon as “energy invisibility.” See COMM. ON BEHAVIORAL & SOC. ASPECTS OF
ENERGY CONSUMPTION & PROD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN
DIMENSION 36–42 (Paul C. Stern & Elliot Aronson eds., 1984).
57. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,
40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 384 (2002).
58. See, e.g., George Lowenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3
J. ECON. PERSP. 181 (1989).
59. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 50, at 1734 (“Consumers’ extremely high discount
rates for long-term savings from one-time purchases tend to serve as a barrier . . . to
economically favorable investments in energy-saving devices.”). For a review of research in the
behavioral sciences on consumption habits and environmental decision making, see PANEL ON
SOC. & BEHAVIORAL SCI. RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR ENVTL. DECISION MAKING, NAT’L
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Moreover, economists have documented similar trends in the
corporate sector when managers make decisions on energy efficiency
60
investments.
D. Utility Incentives
The rate structures of electric and natural gas utilities serve as yet
another barrier to the adoption of energy-efficient products and
practices. Retail rates are generally set by cost-of-service regulation,
in which regulators set rates to compensate utilities for their capital
61
costs and a set profit margin, or through regional wholesale markets.
In either setting, the more energy that utilities supply to end-users,
the more revenue utilities earn, and there is therefore little incentive
for utilities to undertake programs to reduce energy demand. They
are in the business of selling megawatts, not negawatts.62
As a result of this rate structure, firms that are best positioned to
promote conservation and efficiency (because they have an
established business relationship with millions of building owners)63
are indifferent, or even hostile, to the task. To be sure, American
electric utilities have implemented programs aimed at reducing
energy consumption, particularly during peak hours,64 but through the
1980s and 1990s, such programs remained tangential to the core
business objectives of utilities. In 2004, spending by American

RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 78–81 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005).
60. See DeCanio, supra note 53, at 908 (noting the prevalence of high internal “hurdle
rates,” which widely exceed prevailing costs of capital, used by managers when considering
investment decisions); see also SOREN T. ANDERSON & RICHARD G. NEWELL, RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE, INFORMATION PROGRAMS FOR TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: THE CASE OF
ENERGY-EFFICIENCY AUDITS 4–5 (2002), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP02-58.pdf (finding a sixty-five to eighty-five percent hurdle rate in a study of efficiency
investments made by small and medium-sized firms, implying that managers demand a 1.25- to
1.5-year payback on efficiency investments).
61. See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES
WITH INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2-3 to -4 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/
cleanenergy/documents/incentives.pdf.
62. See PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 279 (1999) (defining negawatts as “electricity saved by reducing
inefficiencies in its use”).
63. See Edward Comer, Transforming the Role of Energy Efficiency, 23 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 34, 35 (2008) (“Electric companies maintain the key supporting infrastructures (e.g.,
rates, metering, billing), which are essential for the delivery, verification, and pricing of many
efficiency services.”).
64. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1054 (2d ed. 2006).
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electric utilities on energy efficiency programs was a paltry five
dollars per capita.65 Utilities continue to invest in relatively lowreturn sources of energy supply while ignoring opportunities for
efficiency investments that offer far higher rates of return. In the past
decade, however, over a dozen states have passed “decoupling”
legislation that separates utility revenues from provision of energy,
and there has been an expansion of state legislation promoting energy
efficiency in the utility sector through mandates and performance
targets.66 These trends need to be encouraged to align the private
interests of utilities with the public interest in reducing energy
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.
III. GREENING DEMAND: A TOOLBOX APPROACH
As a result of the barriers discussed above, private investment in
energy-efficient technology and practices is far less than the socially
optimal level of investment. Individual ignorance (not knowing) or
inaction (not bothering) about energy consumption results,
collectively, in a national energy appetite that contributes to climate
disruption and leaves the United States dangerously exposed to
energy supply shocks.
President Obama has committed to working with Congress to
67
enact cap-and-trade legislation for greenhouse gas emissions.
Beyond this critical policy of putting a price on emissions, there are
hundreds of policy measures—from subsidies, to tax credits, to direct
regulation and government R&D—that could potentially be deployed
to promote reductions in energy demand. When land use and longterm transportation changes are included in the mix, the policy
options to reduce energy demand expand even further. This article
does not provide detailed policy recommendations for all the various
energy use sectors (i.e., residential, industrial, and commercial
buildings; automobiles, aviation, and other transportation; industrial

65. MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON.,
REPORT NO. E075, THE STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD FOR 2006, at 7 (2007),
available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e075.htm.
66. MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON.,
REPORT NO. E086, THE 2008 STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD 16–18 (2008), available
at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e086.htm.
67. Remarks on the Federal Budget, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00108, at 2 (Feb. 26,
2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900108.pdf; see also
Steven Mufson, Push to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Would Put a Price on Emitting Pollution,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/12/AR2009031203318.html.
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process equipment; consumer electronics and appliances; etc.). Such
comprehensive recommendations have been provided elsewhere,68
and may very well require a book-length treatment.
Rather, my purpose here is to emphasize the feasibility of
achieving substantial reductions in energy demand through
implementing a toolbox approach that draws on diverse policy
instruments.
These instruments should include performance
standards, information provision, and changes in utility regulation,
and should be designed to counteract the barriers to reducing energy
consumption discussed above.
A. Efficiency Performance Standards
Performance standards directly address the issues of principalagent divergence, high discount rates, and informational barriers by
establishing targets for the efficiency of energy-using products.
Performance standards aimed at energy efficiency would specify the
level of energy use or energy efficiency that must be obtained, while
leaving flexibility for manufacturers to determine how to hit that
69
target. Examples of performance standards would include building
codes that mandate minimum energy efficiency requirements for new
70
construction and energy efficiency standards for new appliances.
Building codes specifying energy efficiency requirements have
been used by various states for decades (California enacted the first
71
While the federal government is unlikely to enact a
in 1978).

68. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY STALEMATE: A
BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES 37 (2004), available at
http://www.energycommission.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/1088 (outlining energy efficiency
recommendations); AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, supra note 10; MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note
19; AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., WINNING THE OIL ENDGAME: INNOVATION FOR PROFITS, JOBS,
AND SECURITY 43–102 (2005).
69. See David M. Dreisen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
289, 297–98 (1998) (explaining that performance standards do not require the use of any
particular technique to achieve the standard).
70. See John Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal
and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10016–17 (2007)
[hereinafter Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing] (discussing the history of CAFE
standards and appliance efficiency standards in the United States and detailing associated
energy savings).
71. For a list of states that have implemented building codes with minimum energy
efficiency requirements, see U.S. DOE, Building Energy Codes—Status of State Energy Codes,
http://www.energycodes.gov/implement/state_codes/index.stm (last visited May 3, 2009).
California’s energy efficiency requirements for new construction are found at CAL. CODE REGS.
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national building code, the February 2009 stimulus bill tied energy
efficiency block grants to the states to certifications by governors that
72
the states will implement energy-efficient building codes —a measure
that should help to promote greener building practices nationally.
With respect to appliances, the Obama Administration should
resuscitate the existing program of appliance efficiency standards,
73
which was neglected under prior administrations. By statute, the
Department of Energy (DOE) was obligated to issue thirty-four
minimum efficiency standards for twenty different consumer product
and industrial equipment categories. It missed the deadline for every
74
category. In a 2006 settlement of litigation brought by fifteen states,
DOE committed to completing all necessary rulemakings by 2011.75
The Department needs adequate staff and resources to meet that
deadline and lock in gains in appliance efficiency that likely would
not be achievable through market forces alone. The appliances
covered by these rulemakings—such as air conditioners, furnaces, and
clothes dryers—account for about thirty percent of total U.S. energy
usage.76
An emerging problem is skyrocketing energy consumption for
consumer electronics that are not covered by any efficiency
performance standard, such as televisions, cell phones, video game
players, and other media devices. This is the fastest-growing segment

tit. 24, pt. 6, available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-400-2008-001/CEC400-2008-001-CMF.PDF (amended code to take effect Aug. 1, 2009).
72. See American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 410(a)(2),
123 Stat. 115 (2009).
73. See National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-12, 101 Stat.
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–97, 6299, 6302, 6303, 6305, 6306, 6308 & 6309
(2000)) (establishing rule-making requirements for twelve appliances); see also Energy Policy
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in Titles 15, 16, 38, and 42 of the U.S.
Code) (adding rule-making requirements for twelve additional appliances). Rule-making
requirements for sixteen additional appliances were added in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 135, 119 Stat. 594.
74. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-07-42, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH DOE’S PROGRAM FOR SETTING EFFICIENCY STANDARDS
CONTINUE TO RESULT IN FORGONE ENERGY SAVINGS 1 (2007). The missed deadlines resulted
in foregone energy savings of at least $28 billion. Id. at 11.
75. See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Attorney Gen., Federal Energy Dept. to Improve
Appliance Efficiency: States Achieve Major Energy Conservation Agreement with Feds (Nov.
13, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/pr111306a.pdf.
76. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 74, at 1.
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of household energy consumption.77 The International Energy
Agency recently projected that the global growth in energy use for
these products through 2030 will be equivalent to all of the current
residential electricity consumption in the United States and Japan
combined.78 While governments have started to address the disposal
79
impacts of electronic products once they are in the waste stream,
there has been comparatively little governmental action to address
the climate impacts of these same products resulting from their
energy consumption. Efficiency performance standards for consumer
electronics should be strongly considered to counteract this projected
leap in energy consumption.
One drawback of performance standards is that they generally
apply only to new products, and therefore contribute only
incremental changes to the efficiency of the existing capital stock.
Performance standards make a difference over many years as capital
stock turns over and more products on the market are subject to the
standards.
This is why performance standards should be
implemented as a supplement to energy price signals, which have a
more immediate effect on the operating costs of all products in the
marketplace.
B. Information Provision
To help counteract the problem of search and information costs,
the federal government should expand existing product labeling
programs aimed at energy efficiency, such as Energy Star. The
Energy Star program, the most successful eco-labeling program in the
United States,80 applies to consumer products in over fifty categories.81
The Energy Star label is awarded to products that are typically ten to
77. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GADGETS AND GIGAWATTS: POLICIES FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENT ELECTRONICS 21 (2009), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/
Gigawatts2009SUM.pdf.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer
Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (2006)
(comparing the approaches of the European Union and the United States regarding the
management of electronics waste).
80. See, e.g., Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-labeling for Energy Efficiency and
Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of U.S. Programs, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 109 (2003) (assessing
private and government-run eco-labeling programs targeting energy efficiency and concluding
that government support is crucial for the credibility, financial support, and long-term viability
of the programs).
81. See Energy Star, Energy Star Qualified Products, http://www.energystar.gov/
index.cfm?fuseaction=find_a_product. (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
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twenty-five percent more efficient than applicable minimum
requirements.82 Energy Star labels visually highlight potential savings
and help consumers choose among competing products. DOE
estimates that in 2007 alone, the program reduced greenhouse gas
emissions by the equivalent of taking 27 million vehicles off the
83
road. Additional funding is needed, both to expand Energy Star to
other product categories84 and to ensure that Energy Star ratings are
accurate and reflect the latest testing techniques.
A 2008
investigation by Consumer Reports found wide discrepancies
between claimed energy consumption on Energy Star labels and
actual energy consumption when the product is put into use.85
A second area in which information provision could reduce
energy consumption is real time pricing (RTP) for electricity. RTP
involves the use of “smart-meters” that would allow end-users of
electricity to see their actual electricity use at any given hour of the
day, as well as the current price of electricity. RTP could make endusers as sensitive to electricity prices as drivers are to short-term
fluctuations in gas prices—prices that are displayed in huge numbers
at every gas station.86 However, RTP must be implemented in the
context of consumer education campaigns and traditional demand
response programs of utilities, such as technology rebates, to win
customer acceptance.87 If expanded successfully beyond initial pilot
programs, RTP would solve several problems at once. It would not
only help to reduce energy consumption, but it would also reduce
stress on the electric grid during peak periods and reduce the need for
88
new generating plants.

82. See Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing, supra note 70, at 10016.
83. Energy
Star,
About
Energy
Star,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?
c=about.ab_index (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
84. Funding for Energy Star was flat under the Bush Administration, at around $48 million
per year. President Bush’s last budget request, for Fiscal Year 2009, cut Energy Star funding by
$4 million, or almost ten percent. See STEVEN NADEL, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECON., FEDERAL ENERGY-EFFICIENCY BUDGET AND ENERGY-EFFICIENCY TAX
INCENTIVES 8 (2008), available at http://files.eesi.org/Nadel_2.14.08.pdf.
85. Energy Star Has Lost Some Luster, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2008, at 24.
86. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 814 (2008) (advocating real-time pricing and arguing that “[m]arket designers need to
enhance demand response by letting retail customers see, and respond to, the effects of very
short-term price changes”) (emphasis omitted).
87. See GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., A SURVEY OF
UTILITY EXPERIENCE WITH REAL TIME PRICING, at ES-9 (2004), available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2733&context=lbnl.
88. See Comer, supra note 63, at 34–35.
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C. Changing Utility Regulation
To promote major reductions in energy consumption, the federal
government should closely examine lessons from utility regulation in
California, which rewards investments in energy efficiency. In 1982,
California was the first state to enact utility decoupling legislation. In
a 2007 expansion of the program, the California Public Utilities
Commission adopted a “shared savings” model, in which the state
adopts energy savings targets, and utilities are then entitled to
between nine and twelve percent of the verified net savings
(depending on whether they come close to, or exceed, the targets),
potentially up to $450 million over a two year period.89 The model
allows California utilities to earn substantial return from reductions in
energy consumption, reversing and upending some of the basic
assumptions of traditional utility regulation. California’s original
decoupling legislation and the subsequent commitment of state
government to achieve energy efficiency gains help to explain why
per capita electricity consumption in California has remained
constant for thirty years, while per capita electricity consumption in
the rest of the United States has increased by fifty percent in the same
time period.90
The federal government needs to tread carefully in expanding
utility incentive programs nationally. Shared savings models are
91
already in place in six states and should not be preempted.
Moreover, utility rate regulation has traditionally been a state, rather
than a federal, function, and the Tenth Amendment would preclude
federal legislation directing states to change their existing rate
92
regulation practices to reward efficiency. Rather than a national
program of utility rate regulation, the Obama Administration and
89. See id. at 36 (outlining shared savings models in California, Arizona, and Ohio); see
also JIYONG EOM, SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVES FOR UTILITY-BASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY
PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA 5–6 (2008), available at http://www.iaee.org/en/students/
best_papers/Jiyong_Eom.pdf (describing the goals of California’s shared savings model).
90. AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, supra note 10, at 23; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2007
INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 3 (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2007publications/CEC-100-2007-008/CEC-100-2007-008-CTF.PDF.
91. See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra note 61, at 6-1 tbl.6-1.
92. The Tenth Amendment prohibits “commandeering” state or local government to
effectuate a federal regulatory program. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(striking down a portion of the Low Level Waste Policy Act requiring states to take title to
radioactive waste not disposed of prior to 1996, and upholding provisions involving financial
rewards from the federal government); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking
down a portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring state and local
officials to conduct background checks on gun purchasers).
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Congress should provide grants and technical assistance to states to
implement rate structures that reward efficiency gains, promoting
93
state experimentation in this area.
IV. CONCLUSION—IS GREENING DEMAND FEASIBLE?
Substantial reductions in energy consumption should be a central
focus of U.S. climate change policy. Greening U.S. energy demand
offers the prospect of greenhouse gas reductions, conventional
pollutant reductions, reduced dependence on foreign energy supplies,
a lower trade deficit, and cost savings. A fifteen percent reduction in
total energy consumption by 2016 and a twenty percent reduction by
2020 are the minimum targets that the Obama Administration should
set.
Are such substantial national reductions feasible? Technical
analyses strongly suggest that they are. A 2007 report by McKinsey
& Co. found that realistic efficiency gains in just three sectors
(buildings, appliances, and industrial facilities) could offset almost all
of the projected increase in national electricity demand by 2030, and
notably, could almost offset the need for new coal-fired power
plants.94 The same report concluded that a “widespread and sustained
national commitment” on energy efficiency and renewable energy
could reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions twenty-eight percent
below 2005 levels by 2030.95 California and several other U.S. states
are already demonstrating that high standards of living can be
achieved with far lower energy consumption than the U.S. average.
According to a recent study by the Rocky Mountain Institute, if forty
U.S. states could match the top ten U.S. states on electricity
productivity, national electricity consumption would drop
approximately thirty percent.96 And because of the 2008–2009
93. The February 2009 stimulus bill provides, somewhat cryptically, that energy efficiency
block grants to states are conditioned, in part, on state regulatory authorities implementing
“cost recovery for prudent investments by utilities in energy efficiency” and an “earnings
opportunity for utilities associated with cost-effective energy efficiency savings.” American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 410(a)(1), 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
94. JON CREYTS ET AL., supra note 33, at xv.
95. See id. at xii, 19 (noting that twenty-eight percent emissions reductions are possible
under McKinsey’s “high-range” greenhouse gas abatement scenario and that achieving the highrange of abatement would require “aggressive, simultaneous, successful actions across all
sectors and geographies fueled by a sense of great urgency”).
96. See NATALIE MIMS ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., ASSESSING THE ELECTRIC
PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND THE U.S. EFFICIENCY OPPORTUNITY 6 (2009), available at http://
ert.rmi.org/files/documents/CGU.RMI.pdf. Electricity productivity refers to dollars of GDP
divided by kilowatt hours consumed. Id.
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recession, near-term reductions in energy demand are expected even
without significant policy intervention.97
The real question is whether a long-term national greening
demand agenda, led by the federal government, is politically feasible.
As John Dernbach has noted, Americans simultaneously follow two
contrasting story lines on energy consumption. On the one hand,
they equate energy consumption with affluence and reductions in
consumption with “a form of martyrdom or impoverishment.”98
“Energy conservation” is a negative term for many Americans,
bringing to mind images of President Carter in his cardigan sweater
by the fire, imploring them to turn down the thermostat and make
“modest sacrifices” to save energy.99 On the other hand, a new
storyline has evolved over the past few years (and particularly during
the presidential campaign), in which energy efficiency means
achieving more with less waste.100 It means financial opportunities,
improved competitiveness, and green jobs.
The challenge for President Obama is to frame the long-term
effort to reduce U.S. energy consumption in terms of this second
narrative, connecting a greening demand strategy with jobs,
opportunity, national security, environmental improvement, and
growth in GDP. The President should stress that we have made
remarkable gains in energy productivity since the 1970s,101 and that
the nation needs to increase those gains so that the absolute amount
of fossil fuel energy consumed in the United States declines. With the

97. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHORT-TERM ENERGY
OUTLOOK 4 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/forecasting/steo/oldsteos/jan09.pdf
(reporting a 5.7% decrease in daily U.S. petroleum consumption in 2008 compared to the 2007
average); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY SOURCES: 2008 FLASH ESTIMATE 2, 15 (2009), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/flash/pdf/flash.pdf. (reporting a 2.8% decline in CO2 emissions
from all fossil fuels and a 6% decline in CO2 emissions from petroleum between 2007 and 2008,
attributed to higher oil prices and to declining economic activity at the end of 2008).
98. Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing, supra note 70, at 10004.
99. See Videotape: President Jimmy Carter, Report to the American People on Energy
(Feb. 2, 1977) (Miller Ctr. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Va.), available at http://millercenter.org/
scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3396.
100. For examples of candidate statements on energy efficiency and green jobs during the
presidential campaign, see BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA,
supra note 8, at 3–4 (discussing the job-creation potential of proposed energy efficiency
policies); JOBS FOR AMERICA: THE MCCAIN ECONOMIC PLAN 8–10 (2008), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/4296859/John-McCains-Jobs-for-America (discussing transportation
and building efficiency programs as a component of McCain’s proposed job creation plan).
101. For example, by 2003, the U.S. was wringing twice as much GDP out of each barrel of
oil used, as compared to 1975. See LOVINS ET AL., supra note 68, at 43.
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prospect of cost savings and job creation from energy efficiency
investments, there may be a governing coalition to implement the
greening demand agenda. That coalition needs to be skillfully
assembled. The future of U.S. climate strategy depends on it.

